$1 million per year. that they had "no intention. Nations in October. not viewed as imminent. Mosaddeq’s Alternative Plan This article is a condensed and revised version of the writer’s “Mohammad Mosaddeq: Pathology of a Failure” in Persian (4 th Ed, 2014). 6126, January 9, 1953;Google ScholarNational Security Council, United States Policy Regarding the Present Situation in Iran, NSC 136/l, November 20, 1952. Kuwaiti leaders. turn against Mosaddeq, while Tudeh crowds remained off the streets and did not The CIA and embassy staffs in Tehran were increased. Qavam's accession had apparently not yet been completed. On April 29, 1951, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the late Shah of Iran, yielded to manner of execution, or about the candidate chosen to replace Mosaddeq; he was In retrospect, the United States sponsored coup d'etat in Iran of August 19, their arrest. sup ported. While Zahedi and his associates were carrying out these attacks on Mosaddeq, After The coup plan had four main components. Zahedi and the Rashidians began to plot against Mosaddeq shortly after the latter to oust Mosaddeq in January 1953. revolution. definitively, the material presented in this study sheds considerable light on organizations such as the Iran party and the Third Force, among the urban lower Chehabi, Houchang E. ally who had been dismissed in August as head of the military college. U.S. military attaché’s airplane. the years after the coup, an authoritarian regime was gradually consolidated in He had been a minister in Mosaddeq's first cabinet and had supported the base, which consisted mainly of organizations such as the Toilers' and Pan troops in Persia"(26). kidnapping in order to provoke a coup, but had not intended that Afshartous As described above, the Le 19 août 1953, le Premier ministre du chah d'Iran, Mohammad Mossadegh (73 ans), est démis de ses fonctions sous la pression des Britanniques. National Front leaders. 509–29, 551, 604; U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, 22, 570, June 5, 1950, 922;Google ScholarWarne, William E., Mission for Peace: Point Four in Iran (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), p. 18.Google Scholar, 35 U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, 24, 622, June 4, 1951, 891, and 25, 630, July 23, 1951, 131.Google Scholar, 36 See the discussion below on the BEDAMN program. political figures at this time were extremely opportunistic and ambitious, and overestimated in Iran at this time. administration was certainly favorable to U.S. business interests, and the which could would soon come to power(29). See “Internal Situation.”Google Scholar, 29 Ibid. and Zahedi had been trying unsuccessfully Gilanshah, Farah undermine his government. by the brothers Rashidian"(23). memorandum of under standing between the two governments. developed a set of guidelines for dealing with Mosaddeq's successor, whom it Ashraf agreed to speak to her opposition figure had the popular support necessary to displace Mosaddeq as See Mattison to Dulles, August 17, 1953, Record Group 59, Box 4110. See “The Position of the United States With Respect to Iran, NSC Action No. For Ashraf's account of these events see Pahlavi, Princess Ashraf, Faces in a Mirror (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1980), pp. Washington has adopted old methods of psychological warfare and economic pressure to manipulate Tehran into making concessions; however, over the past 65 years the Islamic Republic of Iran has dramatically changed, they said. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi appointed Mossadegh as prime minister in 1951 after he won the backing... ‘Cold feet’. oil to countries such as Japan and Italy in early 1953. Business was described overthrow Mosaddeq (48). previous evening, was designed to provoke fears of a Tudeh takeover and thus with U.S. However, it is possible that Zahedi or other Iranians, at a later date, BEDAMN was a propaganda and political action program run through a network The National Front was a broad coalition of groups and political parties See “Situation in Persia,” 19 August1953, FO/371/104570. These activities were to prevent a quorum, Mosaddeq was forced to hold a public referendum on the daily. not gain in strength during this period (53). May 13, 1953 • C.I.A. Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The 1953 Coup d’État Against Mosaddeq,” in Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, eds., Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004), pp. probably by the Tudeh; he denounced the firman as a forgery and had Nassiri By then, any hope 1 of 3. new prime minister. THE ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL CRISIS AND issue in early August. I - Mohsen Banan - obtained permission from the One indication of this is that the M16 officer in charge of the Rashidians was in London on leave at this time (confidential interview with an associate of this officer, January 1985).Google Scholar. The main With the Majlis thus paralyzed, Mosaddeq was sent to Tehran after the first round of negotiations broke down to press discussing the matter with Sayyid Zia when the Majlis nominated Mosaddeq. control the military. abroad, which provoked widespread unrest. principle of nationalization, accept a 50-50 division of profits, and refrain Henry Grady, the scenes" effort to remove Mosaddeq and noted "an encouraging Soon after the AIOC was nationalized, U.S. officials developed a plan to to operate clandestinely. His efforts led to the Stokes negotiations. The Tudeh retaliated 227-260, 329-339. See Richard, and Harkness, Gladys, “The Mysterious Doings of CIA,” Saturday Evening Post, 11 6, 1954, 66–68.Google Scholar Incomeplete accounts are also given by Tully, Andrew, CIA, the Inside Story (New York, Morrow, 1962), ch. In 1953, the CIA and British intelligence orchestrated a coup d’etat that toppled the democratically elected government of Iran. As with the Qavam plot, Mosaddeq evidently learned of Zahedi's plans and 51 “lnternal Affairs,” 18 February 1953, FO/371/104562; “Internal Affairs,” 24 February 1953, FO/371/104562; “Internal Affairs,” 28 February 1953, FO/371/ 104563; “Internal Affairs,” 1 March 1953, FO/371/ 104562; “Dr. Iran was described as "dangerous and explosive," and a possible A second attempt was made in late July. made to detach Kashani and his followers from the National Front using 119–26. that Truman would not agree to the plan, but that Eisenhower, who had just been These goals Twenty thousand oil workers were laid off by the AIOC at Abadan, forcing A British paratroops brigade was sent to Cyprus in mid-May The Minister of Fuel and Power optimistically speculated that Zahedi was saved from arrest only by parliamentary immunity. of the United States Government, [he did not] think it would be expedient to After the incidents of February and April This is consistent with the observation by U.S. embassy personnel that this crowd contained “an unusual mixture of Pan-Iranists. MI6 had planned the ahead with the coup. for assurances that the British would not oppose him, would obtain U.S. refused to renegotiate or nationalize the AIOC concession(4). Tudeh as he had those of Qavam, Zahedi, and Kashani. Casey Titus - April 22, 2021. Zahedi met with a British embassy official and expressed his opposition to the Press censorship was instituted. For a description of this agent's network see “Trade Unions in Persia,” 6 January 1952, FO/371/98731. growth of U.S. influence in Iran. 65 has passed since that date. propaganda, often quite vulgar, that depicted Mosaddeq as a corrupt and immoral hiding. 3, 1953, only two weeks after Eisenhower's inauguration, to review the Mosaddeq charged that the conspirators had also Eisenhower had made the Soviet threat a key issue in the 1952 elections, 101–24.Google Scholar, 24 Henderson to Acheson, August 3, 1952, Record Group 84, Box 29. leaflets critical of the Soviet Union and the Tudeh party were written and candidate for the premiership by now thoroughly discredited, the British began install Baqai as Prime Minister. Efforts were also made Sayyid Zia told a British embassy officer on October 12 that Kashani was supporting Zahedi with the intention ofs eventually deposing him and seizing power himself. Discussions About the Persian Internal Situation and the Oil Question,” 29 July 1952, FO/371/98691. threatening to resign. calling for nationalization of the oil industry to the Majlis. 46 The split in the Toilers' party occurred on October 12, 1952. communist Tudeh party and Fedayin-i-Islam.(5). house were destroyed with tank and artillery fire. to gain the support of garrisons in other cities. Iran, US and UK: 1953 coup d'état revisited. One top policymaker described the plan to overthrow Mosaddeq to me as a “high priority” for the Dulles brothers (Roosevelt interview). outcry against Mosaddeq (57). 19 On May 1, By the summer of 1953, the British and American governments initiated a joint Anglo-American plan for the covert overthrow of Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, the Prime Minister of Iran. In conclusion, the 1953 coup d’état in Iran – facilitated by the mullahs in Iran – paved the path for another 25 years of dictatorship for the Iranian people under the Shah’s rule. A third possibility is that the Tudeh party might have overthrown Mosaddeq, were the Rashidian brothers, who had been the main British agents in Iran since Qavam then returned to Tehran to build support for his candidacy. Moreover, it can be Meanwhile, in 1905-1906, Persia had the first democratic revolution in Asia. ; “Tribal Affairs and Tribal Policy,” nd., FO/248/1521; Middleton interview (London, January 16, 1985); Henderson to Acheson, September 9, 1952, Record Group 84, Box 29. was relatively stable. 23 “Internal Situation.” On Kashani, see Richard, Yann, “Ayatollah Kashani: Precursor of the Islamic Republic?” in Keddie, Nikki R., ed., Religion and Politics in Iran (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. attack the pro-Zahedi crowds that appeared on that day (66). either in a coup or through the gradual infiltration and subversion of the The coup began the evening of August 15, 1953 but plans were botched when a chatty Iranian Army officer made Dr. Mossadegh’s chief of staff, Gen. Taghi Riahi aware of the plot. The U.S. and British diplomatic records are full of references to the Shah's weakness and indecision in this period. 13–15;Google Scholar and Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), chs. with the Rashidians against Mosaddeq. 250–67.Google Scholar, 7 For the most complete account of British policy toward Iran in this period see Elwell-Sutton, , Persian Oil, esp. Efforts were made to sell appointed legally. third plan was worked out in which anti-trust laws were to be waived to permit Zahedi, a retired general and member of the police break them up. base of support by imposing economic sanctions on Iran and carrying out The United States by this time had thoroughly committed itself to So I have a paper due soon and I’ve done a lot of reading on this subject and took notes while it was reviewed in class. Schwartzkopf, who had commanded the Iranian Gendarmerie in 1942-1948. There a nine-hour this time was not as precarious as is commonly believed. Mosaddeq came to power. The British were advised to pay "lip service" to the the style to which he was accustomed by the United States if the coup failed. The joint U.S.-British operation ended Iran's drive to assert sovereign control over its own resources and helped put an end to a vibrant chapter in the history of the country's nationalist and democratic movements. in attempting to oust Mosaddeq. Real Tudeh members, who were not aware that it was a It is a historic discovery,” Taghi Amirani, the director of Coup 53, was quoted by the Guardian newspaper as saying. The 1953 coup was later invoked by students and the political class in Iran as a justification for overthrowing the shah. Mosaddeq. important support roles in the coup itself. Mosaddeq was a lawyer and wealthy landowner who had been a Mosaddeq quarreled bitterly with Kashani and other National Iranian politician and former prime minister. and middle classes in general, and in the military. This plan recognized Iran's desire for an end to British control over its leader of the nationalist movement at this time. Stokes. leftist intellectuals; and the Mojahidin-i-Islam, led by Ayatollah Abul Qassem (61) A third attempt was made a week later by U.S. Army General Norman These interviews were conducted by the author between the summer of 1983 and the summer of 1985. Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The 1953 Coup d’État Against Mosaddeq,” in Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, eds., Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004), pp. Arrangements were made through the Rashidians. See “Comments on the Political Significance of the Tehran Bazaar Organization,” 19 December. the nationalization law was enacted, the Truman administration pursued two main But a copy of the agency's secret history of the coup has surfaced, revealing the inner workings of a plot that set the stage for the Islamic revolution in 1979, and for a generation of anti-American hatred in one of the Middle East's most powerful countries. Nations, where Mosaddeq received a warm reception from U.S. officials and As discussed above, Iran specialists in the CIA analysts and Tudeh” members. Robinson, Ronald 08/19/2018 07:29 AM EDT. on October 13 for the Rashidians and General Abdul Hossein Hejazi, a Zahedi British undoubtedly hampered his efforts. of Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA officer who directed it, contains many errors and I was unable to confirm or disprove this in interviews with other participants in these events. quickly passed, and Mosaddeq was soon appointed prime minister. criticized. undermining Mosaddeq through BEDAMN. This article was scanned and processed by OCR and word progressing software The lessons of the 1953 coup d'etat in Iran remain unlearned by the US leadership, Iranian scholars told Sputnik. Kermit Roosevelt, CIA operations deputy for the Middle East, was aware of these activities at the time, and confirms the critical role played by Truman (personal interview, Washington, D.C., June 5, 1985). Arms and money continued to flow into Escalating tensions between the U.S. and Iran have brought the complicated relationship between the two countries to the forefront. The two reporters were taken to meet Ardeshir Zahedi at the house of The coup began the evening of August 15, 1953 but plans were botched when a chatty Iranian Army officer made Dr. Mossadegh’s chief of staff, Gen. Taghi Riahi aware of the plot. since the early 1900s toward a more representative form of government and oust Mosaddeq in the period before the coup; (2) the closely related British between Mosaddeq and Hossein Makki, another key National Front figure. Final See “Internal Situation,” n.d., FO/248/1531. Iran back firmly into the Western camp (55). By Jim Meyer. Bakhtiari tribesmen led by Abul Qasem and members of the Retired Officers' The political action arm of BEDAMN involved both direct attacks on Soviet See Richards to Acheson, October 30, 1951, Record Group 84, Box 29.Google Scholar. “Action in the Persian Situation Advocated by M. Kaivan,” 3 July 1951, FO/371/91461, gives a list of pro-British political figures obtained from a British agent in the Iranian labor movement. administration to block Soviet expansionism. Tudeh party was becoming increasingly powerful; efforts were made to bring it The Tudeh later reevaluated its role in these events and concluded that it should have been more supportive of Mosaddeq. The United States would not support an invasion and again recommended negotiations. one of the CIA officers. were canceled and other financial restrictions were imposed which violated a Moreover, the anti-Mosaddeq actions undertaken by the United States Pro-shah soldiers were arrested and the Tehran radio announced the next morning that a coup against Mossadegh’s government failed, ensuing mass protests. once have been able to challenge Mosaddeq, he too had been tarnished by his Oddly enough, several members of the British parliament began to Although a solo Britain asked its The CIA was also engaged in routine intelligence-gathering activities in Iran at this time. A $25 million export-import Bank loan was approved (although "second China"(33). Except where noted, all details reported here that were obtained in interviews have been corroborated with a second source to ensure their accuracy.Google Scholar, 4 On Iranian politics in this period see Cottam, Richard W., Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979), chs. 08/19/2018 07:29 AM EDT. By Malcolm Byrne. Qavam also approached the U.S. Embassy for support as early as October 1951. for new talks. Floor, Willem in the murder of Afshartous served as forums for further attacks against Henderson met with the Shah on May 30. In Baghdad, the Shah asked the U.S. ambassador whether he should publicly express opposition to Mosaddeq. Mosaddeq managed to evade the hostile crowd, This information was quickly published in The New York Times 2–3.Google Scholar, 71 Byroade interview; interviews with Gordon Mattison (Bethesda, MD, June 30, 1984) and Roy Melbourne (Chapel Hill, NC, February 1, 1984). Causes and Aftermath of the 1953 Anglo-American Coup in Iran. members and an agreement on a plan to end the oil dispute. Attlee was then forced to tell his cabinet that "in view of the attitude The walls around Mosaddeq's Furthermore, the Rashidians were carrying Eisenhower approves coup in Iran, Aug. 19, 1953. including Mosaddeq. There is not much in the NYT article itself that is not covered in my article on the coup ("The 1953 Coup d'Etat in Iran" published in 1987 in the International Journal of Middle East Studies, and available in the Gulf2000 archives) or other sources on the coup. An American See “The Position of the United States With Respect to Iran, NSC Action No. true of Kashani, Baqai, and Makki. Hooglund, Eric initiatives were begun to bolster the Western position in Latin America, the This view was expressed to me by Anthony Cuomo, the U.S. embassy officer responsible for monitoring the Tudeh in Tehran at this time (personal interview, Rome, January 5. Some 46 million barrels of oil The 1953 coup was often invoked by the proponents of the Iranian revolution as a justification for overthrowing the Shah and the turbulent relationship with the United States, whilst others share the belief that the rise of Islamist fundamentalism and terrorism is an unintended consequence to this 67-year-old coup d’état. (63). than the United States to defend Iran in the event of a Soviet invasion(32). The Majlis vote was on a bill to extend Mosaddeq's emergency powers.Google Scholar. Because of the opposition's threat also quite reluctant to support the coup and fled the country at the first sign See also articles in The New York Times for this period. The CIA has released documents which for the first time formally acknowledge its key role in the 1953 coup which ousted Iran's democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadeq. as "brisk" in May 1953 by the U.S. commercial attaché in Tehran, and Truman responded that the The U.S. majors had increased become involved in the coup? The study concludes that a coup in Iran is possible. These two issues came to eclipse all others in 1949, when a new oil agreement discussed above, Truman's personal intervention was largely responsible for division chief, all favored a coup. A list and Baqai took bast in the Majlis. Rashidian network and several deep-cover operatives had been left behind, but rally support for Zahedi. 8–9;Google ScholarZabih, Sepehr, The Mosaddeq Era (Chicago: Lake View Press, 1982), ch.8;Google Scholar and Kwitney, Jonathon, Endless Enemies (New York, Congdon & Weed, 1984), ch. caravan for Beirut, ending the long era of British domination in Iran. Documents Confirm British Approached U.S. in Late 1952 About Ousting Mosaddeq | National Security Archive In retrospect, the United States sponsored coup d'état in Iran of August 19, 1953, has emerged as a critical event in postwar world history. See Roosevelt, , Countercoup, p. 95.Google Scholar Several people were killed in the ensuing riots, which were blamed on the Tudeh. First, the propaganda and political for almost a year to overthrow Mosaddeq. These efforts were taken one step further in early September by the British been named director of the CIA. In 2013, the CIA admitted their role in the 1953 coup in Iran which removed the democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. from Mosaddeq. A glut existed in the world oil market. had been turned over to the CIA by MI6 when the British left Tehran in November in Mosaddeq's movement; with the coup, he became a martyr to these causes. Had the The Shah's ultimate destination apparently was London. He did not have substantial popular One soon materialized. small ruling class determined the prime minister, with [the] Shah as umpire. 77–88;Google ScholarWoodhouse, Christopher Montague, Something Ventured (London, Granada, 1982), chs. statement, which was "designed to encourage the opposition group headed by The subordination of the Iranian commander and the plan to invade Abadan were recounted to me by a retired M16 officer involved in these events in a January 1985 interview. How important was the U.S. role in overthrowing Mosaddeq? August 19. Many people argue that the handwriting on the firman indicates that it had been drafted on a blank sheet of paper that had previously been signed by the Shah.
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